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Flanders District of Creativity is the Flemish organization for business creativity. It was 
founded by the Flemish Government as a non-profi t organization and enjoys broad support. Flemish 
businesses, academia, and public institutions use Flanders DC as a platform for cooperation in the 
pursuit of a more creative region. Creativity is the key ingredient to make companies more success-
ful and to help regional governments ensure a healthy economy with more jobs. 
Flanders DC inspires creativity and innovation:
1. by learning from the most creative regions in the world,
2. by igniting creative sparks in everyday life and business, and
3. through research, practical business tools and business training, provided in 
 cooperation with the Flanders DC Knowledge Center.
 
1. DISTRICTS OF CREATIVITY: INSPIRATION FROM THE MOST CREATIVE REGIONS
Responses to global challenges are 
best found within an international 
network of excellence. Flanders 
DC aims to unite the most dynamic 
regions in the world within the 
‘Districts of Creativity’ network, with the single aim of learn-
ing from the very best. Every two years, Flanders DC convenes 
the Creativity World Forum, bringing together government 
leaders, entrepreneurs, and knowledge institutions to exchange 
ideas about how to tackle pressing economic problems and 
make their regions hotbeds for innovation and creativity.
2.  RAISING AWARENESS: THE BEST WAY TO PREDICT THE FUTURE IS TO INVENT IT
Flanders DC encourages entre-
preneurs and citizens to look 
ahead and fi nd creative solutions 
today to tomorrow’s problems. 
Flanders DC has developed an idea 
generation tool to encourage people and organizations to take 
the fi rst step toward innovation. In addition, Flanders DC runs a 
general awareness-raising campaign entitled “Flanders’ Future”.
 FLANDERS DISTRICT OF CREATIVITY
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3.  THE FLANDERS DC KNOWLEDGE CENTRE: ACADEMIC SUPPORT
The Flanders DC Knowledge Center entails a cooperation between 
Flanders DC and the Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School. Each 
year, the Flanders DC Knowledge Centre publishes several reports and 
develops various tools, case studies and courses. All these projects focus 
on the role of creativity in a business environment and identify obstacles 
to and accelerators of competitive growth. 
Below is a list of some of the fi nished projects and a number of forthcoming projects (for an 
overview of current projects and available downloads, please consult www.fl andersdc.be or see 
www.vlerick.be/fl andersdc):
Research projects and tools:
• THE FLEMISH ECONOMY IN 2015: Challenges for the Future – The Need for a Creative Growth 
Model. Published in Dutch in September 2005. 
• BUSINESS CREATIVITY AS A MOTOR FOR GROWTH IN FLEMISH CITIES AND BRUSSELS. 
Published in Dutch in November 2005. 
• THE CREATIVE ECONOMY: Challenges and Opportunities for DC regions. Published in English 
in April 2006. 
• PLAYERS IN THE TV SECTOR BEAR WITNESS. An exploratory Study in the Creative Industry. 
Published in Dutch in June 2006.
• HOW TO MOBILIZE AND STIMULATE OUR ELDERLY WORKFORCE. Published in Dutch in June 2006.
• THE CREATIVE INDUSTRY IN FLANDERS. Due to be published in Dutch in November 2006.
• DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX. Due to be published in English 
in November 2006.
• INNOVATION OUTSIDE THE LAB: Strategic Innovation as the Alternative. Published in English 
in October 2006.
• AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS IN 
INDUSTRY SCIENCE-RELATIONS. Due to be published in English in December 2006.
• HOW DO ENTREPRENEURS IDENTIFY OPPORTUNITIES IN FLANDERS AND ABROAD. 
Due to be published in Dutch in December 2006.
• NETWORKING AND INNOVATION CAPACITY IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES IN FLAN-
DERS. Due to be published in English in December 2006.
• INNOVATION PROCESSES IN LARGE AND SMALL COMPANIES. Due to be published in 
Dutch in December 2006. 
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• ARTECONOMY. How Artists Infl uence Transformation Processes. Due to be published in 
Dutch in February 2007
• CREATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP. Due to be published in Dutch in March 2007.
• ONLINE LEARNING PLATFORM ON CREATIEVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP. Due to be online 
in April 2007.
• HOW INNOVATIVE ARE WE REALLY? Due to be published in English in May 2007.
• OPEN INNOVATION IN EUROPE. Due to be published in English in July 2007.
• FLANDERS' ATTRACTIVENESS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT. Due to be published in 
English in November 2008.
Knowledge Sharing
• FLANDERS DC & VACATURE WINTER ACADEMY. From 16 through 19 February 2006.
• A VISITING PROFESSOR FROM AUCKLAND ON CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING. 
September 2006.
• SCHOLARSHIPS FOR GOVERNMENT AND CREATIVE SECTOR - Master Class in 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation.
• FLANDERS DC FELLOWS. Creative entrepreneurs serving as role models for innovation. 
First batch in December 2006.
• CREATIVITY TALKS. Monthly sessions on business creativity and innovation from 
September 2006 through May 2007.
…
The partners and members of the Board of Directors of Flanders DC are:
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This report discusses a study commissioned by Flanders District of Creativity on Flemish companies’ 
strategic innovation.
The study was conducted between December 2005 and August 2006. The main researchers involved 
in the project were Professor Marion Debruyne, an associate professor, and junior researcher Marie 
Schoovaerts, both being staff at the Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School. 
0 BACKGROUND
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There is mounting recognition that if companies escape from cutthroat competition, they need to move 
away from established industry recipes. The business press coined the term “strategic innovation” 
to refer to companies that radically change the rules of the game in an industry by competing in a 
fundamentally different way. There is no shortage of examples: Amazon in book retailing, Dell in personal 
computers, Southwest Airlines in the airline industry, IKEA in furniture retailing, and so on.
The common thread running through all these success stories is that the companies in question did not 
innovate in the traditional sense by investing in R&D and then launching next-generation products, but 
instead challenged conventional thinking within their respective sector (Markides, 1997). They reshaped 
the way business is done, all the while focusing fi rmly on delivering customer value to the mass 
market (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Kim and Mauborgne, 1996; Markides, 1998). This entailed 
rethinking their target markets, rethinking customer needs and wants, and rethinking the entire value 
delivery process. Past literature has primarily offered case-based descriptions of what constitutes the 
primary source of the competitive advantage derived from such an approach. Many questions remain 
unanswered. Are these really examples of one and the same phenomenon, or are they rather one-
time exceptions? Did they come about through sheer good fortune, or are they the fruits of deliberate 
management practices? Finally, are the characteristics of the approach also drivers of success, or does 
success hinge on other factors? 
Strategic innovation means competing within an existing industry in a fundamentally different way that 
redefi nes and enhances customer value.
Unlike traditional innovation, this different way of competing does not entail product innovation as such. 
Rather, superior value for customers is derived from innovations in organization. Such innovation may 
relate to the product concept, production, service provision, or the marketing of the respective product 
or service. For strategic innovation to occur, activities and capabilities are leveraged in such a way as to 
offer customer value that breaks with established industry recipes. 
1 INTRODUCTION
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
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The objective of the study was to investigate the following research questions:
1. What are the key elements of strategic innovation?
2. Does strategic innovation lead to performance?
3. To what extent do Flemish fi rms implement the principles of strategic innovation?
4. How do fi rms that innovate strategically differ from those that don’t?
  1 The case studies will be submitted to the European Case Clearing House after being cleared by the participating companies.
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3 RESEARCH METHOD
A two-pronged approach was adopted, with the study consisting of a qualitative and a quantitative 
stage.
The qualitative stage involved two case studies, each of which scrutinized a specifi c company. The 
objective of the case studies was to gain deeper insights into the phenomenon of strategic innovation. 
The case studies also provided valuable learning material1. Section 4 of this report discusses the case 
studies in further detail.
The quantitative stage of the study comprised a large-scale survey of Flemish fi rms. All fi rms with more 
than 50 employees and located in Flanders were sent the survey and an accompanying letter. We 
targeted general managers and vice presidents of the selected fi rms’ strategic business unit (SBU). For 
fi rms without such a management structure usually the CEO was selected to fi ll out the questionnaire. We 
sent out the questionnaire together with a personalized letter and reply envelope. The letter introduced 
the research and gave a hyperlink to a website, enabling the respondents to fi ll out the questionnaire on 
the Internet if they so desired. Two weeks later, the respondents were sent an e-mail reminder, which 
was followed up two weeks later. In all, 187 questionnaires were fi lled out, yielding a 7% response rate. 
Section 5 contains a report on the results of the research.
A fellow research team at the Research Center for Strategy & Innovation at the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam (VUA) conducted a similar survey in the Netherlands. Section 5.3 compares the Flemish 
data with the Dutch data.
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4 CASE STUDY RESEARCH
To gain a greater insight into the concept of strategic innovation, we conducted two case studies 
focusing on two distinctly innovative companies: Weekendesk and Eurinpro. These companies fi t the 
defi nition of strategic innovation that we described in the introduction, and as such offer valuable insights 
into the key elements that defi ne a strategic innovator. The case studies are useful in two ways: they 
confi rm the fi ndings of the quantitative study and they also provide additional information that affords 
new insights into those fi ndings. 
4.1.  Methodology
To fi nd two strategic innovators, we kept a close eye on the business press and selected companies that 
demonstrated features of strategic innovation. Desk research was conducted to fi nd out whether these 
companies matched our defi nition of strategic innovation. Initially, six companies were selected: Carry 
Flor, Woestijnvis, Accent, Ormit, Weekendesk, and Eurinpro. After careful consideration, Weekendesk 
and Eurinpro turned out to be the most relevant companies for this research project. In addition, they 
complement each other, since Weekendesk is a start-up company, while Eurinpro is an incumbent 
company.
For both case studies, we set up initial meetings to gain an understanding of the respective company’s 
business and confi rm that it constituted a valid instance of strategic innovation. After evaluating the 
information retrieved from these interviews, we drew up a list of all the information that was still needed 
and then scheduled second and third interviews. Table 1 identifi es the interviewees. The topics covered 
during these interviews were based on the available literature and looked specifi cally at the company’s 
business model and the skills required to sustain it. The next phase is still ongoing: we are currently 
writing up the case studies and will then present them to the companies for approval. 
‡ Table 1 Interviewees at Eurinpro and Weekendesk
FIRST ROUND OF INTERVIEWS
Marc Verhagen Weekendesk  CEO
Karoline Neujens Weekendesk  Marketing Manager
Geert Vanhees Eurinpro  Marketing Manager
SECOND ROUND OF INTERVIEWS
Bart Verhaeghe Eurinpro  CEO
THIRD ROUND OF INTERVIEWS
Marc Verhagen Weekendesk  CEO
Karoline Neujens Weekendesk  Marketing Manager
Danny Peeters Eurinpro  Chief Operations Offi cer
Eddy Huysman Eurinpro  Chief Technical Offi cer
Jan Van Lancker Eurinpro  General Counsel
CASE STUDY RESEARCH / 4
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4.2.   Eurinpro and Weekendesk: A case description
4.2.1.  Weekendesk
4.2.1.1. Who, what, how?
Weekendesk is an Antwerp-based company that is active in Belgium, the Netherlands and France. 
The company has two product lines: hotel packages and gift boxes. The customers books his hotel 
package on the Internet, without any involvement on the part of the hotel or any third party. The focus 
is on weekend stays within a 200-mile radius. The gift boxes are cardboard boxes that focus on a given 
theme, and offer a range of “experiences” to the gift’s recipient. Examples of such ‘experiences’ are a 
helicopter fl ight, a wellness weekend, a stay at a holiday park, a sauna visit, and so on. Recipients can 
book the experience of their choice on the website. 
Central to Weekendesk’s business model is the Internet. Customers can only book their hotel packages 
over the Internet. However, (only) 50% of gift box sales are generated via the Internet; the remaining 50% 
are generated through selected complementary sales channels, such as Dreamland, AS Adventure, and 
Connections.
Weekendesk targets specifi c customers: for the hotel business it targets people who are willing to use 
the Internet to book a hotel, instead of going to a traditional travel agent. For its gift boxes, Weekendesk 
targets customers who fi nd the idea of giving an experience as a gift appealing. Such people are open 
to new experiences and want to share them with the recipient of their gift. The choice of sales channels 
is geared toward these kinds of customers: the Internet as an increasingly popular channel that is being 
used more and more by consumers to effect purchases of all kinds; AS Adventure as an “outdoor 
action” store; Connections as a travel agent for adventurous tourists; and Dreamland as a gift store. 
4.2.1.2.  A strategic innovator?
Weekendesk combines features of both the travel industry and the gift sector, but implements a business 
model that is distinctly different from both. Although Weekendesk’s products are somewhat innovative, 
the company went further than mere product innovation: its entire organization was organized in such 
a way as to deliver superior customer value, offering an innovative product to a new set of customers 
through a new channel. No other company offers the same as Weekendesk, combining a hotel business 
and a gift box business. 
A number of support activities and capabilities are established to maintain the company’s business 
model: the use of the Internet as a sales channel, a telephone helpdesk, sales and contracting skills 
needed to conclude deals with hotels and the organizers of the experiences it offers, and the key 
value of “what you see is what you get.” Thus, Weekendesk employs a team of photographers and 
copywriters to make sure that all the information supplied to customers by the company is as accurate 
as possible. 
CASE STUDY RESEARCH / 4
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4.2.2. Eurinpro
4.2.2.1. Who, what, how?
Eurinpro is a pan-European provider of customer-centric, tailor-made logistic real estate. The 
company covers the entire process involved in building warehouses, placing its customers fi rst. 
Depending on its customers’ requirements, Eurinpro seeks the best solution at various levels. e.g. 
in terms of the warehouse’s location, quality, and price. Eurinpro concludes a rental agreement with 
the customer, then sells the whole project, including that rental agreement to an investor, often even 
before the tenant occupies the building.
Thus, Eurinpro serves two kinds of customers: customers with logistic needs and institutional 
investors. Accordingly, Eurinpro needs to offer an adequate value proposition to both parties: the 
customer with a logistic need gets to rent a tailor-made warehouse, and the investor gets to buy a 
warehouse that is also partially standardized to guarantee its ongoing value.
Eurinpro is faster and less expensive than other providers of logistics real estate. Over time, Eurinpro 
developed the resources and capabilities it needs to offer such superior value. First of all, the company 
streamlined the handling of incoming requests for proposals and project management. Its technical 
department can draw up a proposal within 24 hours. Then it fi xes the price, timing of delivery, and 
quality of the warehouse. The technical department enjoys Eurinpro’s full backing, comprising an 
international matrix structure plus a range of carefully selected employees active in different areas to 
make sure that Eurinpro operates as a one-stop-shop. In addition, Eurinpro controls a full network of 
its own (sub)contractors, who channel the knowledge they have acquired over the years by following 
guidelines governing their work processes. Every division of Eurinpro drafts, follows, and passes on 
these guidelines to other employees within the company. 
4.2.2.2. A strategic innovator?
Unlike Weekendesk, Eurinpro does not combine two business models to create a new one. Rather, 
Eurinpro has broken with the established recipe followed in its sector by traditional logistics real 
estate providers and created a new, independent business model. Instead of working along tailor-
made, customer-centric lines, traditional real-estate providers follow an on-risk, top-down approach: 
fi rst they secure a location, then they build the warehouse, and only at the very end of the process 
does the customer come onto the scene. By contrast, Eurinpro starts with the customer’s desires 
and then builds the appropriate warehouse.
Under the guidance of CEO Bart Verhaeghe, this strategy has created superior customer value for 
both types of Eurinpro customers, delivering tailor-made warehouses faster and less expensively 
than the company’s rivals.
CASE STUDY RESEARCH / 4
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4.3.  Learning points
Eurinpro and Weekendesk operate in completely different environments and offer totally different 
products, but one thing they have in common is that they have both been strategically innovative at 
least once. Since Eurinpro and Weekendesk are so different (incumbent versus start-up, pan-European 
versus a presence in just three European countries, logistics real estate versus the gift business, and so 
on), it is interesting to see where they converge and where they differ. 
To start with, Weekendesk and Eurinpro share a refusal to follow the dominant recipe in their industry, 
steering clear of the strategies pursued by other players in their respective industries. For Eurinpro, this 
is very clear: the dominant approach in its sector is  an on-risk, top-down approach, whereas Eurinpro 
adopts a diametric, on-demand, customer-centric approach. Weekendesk on the other hand, does not 
even belong within a single sector, opting instead to combine the features of two businesses (travel and 
gifts), and add new features to complete its business model.
Furthermore, while rejecting the conventional approach taken within their respective industry, Weekendesk 
and Eurinpro have both created new markets, serving customers who either were not served before, or 
were unhappy with the manner in which they were being served. Weekendesk appeals to customers 
who want to use the Internet to control the whole process of selecting, buying, and booking a hotel 
package or a gift box, and to consumers who are looking for a packaged experience rather than just a 
stay in a hotel. By contrast, Eurinpro targets two groups of customers: customers with a logistic need 
and institutional investors who integrate the company’s real estate projects into their property portfolio. 
The fi rst group of customers comprises a growing number of fi rms that value a logistics real estate 
provider who follows them around the world providing tailor-made warehouses, and that are open to 
outsourcing their logistics real estate needs. The second group of customers comprises real estate 
investors. Hence, both companies gear their services to a new set of customers who were not (well) 
served before and who now receive superior customer value and have their requirements met in a way 
that the industry’s incumbents are unable to match. 
But how can two companies deliver such superior customer value to the markets they opened up? As 
the two case studies show, Weekendesk and Eurinpro share some characteristics that enabled them 
to become strategic innovators. 
CASE STUDY RESEARCH / 4
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To begin with, leadership plays a crucial role in determining the path a company will follow. At Eurinpro, 
it was CEO Bart Verhaeghe who fi nalized Eurinpro’s business model by narrowing down the strategic 
focus of the company. At Weekendesk, founders Marc Verhagen and Bruno Spaas decided they wanted 
to do “something new” on the Internet, so they founded Weekendesk. In both cases, the CEO’s had 
a distinct vision of where they wanted their company to go and didn’t care what others in their sector 
were doing. One striking factor is that in both cases the strategic innovator was an outsider, i.e. not from 
the industry in question, and developed a completely fresh perspective compared with the prevailing 
business model.
A second characteristic that enabled Eurinpro and Weekendesk to become strategic innovators was 
their specifi c market orientation. Both fi rms are continually experimenting in their markets, and the 
establishment of their business model entailed continuous learning and adaptation. Especially when it 
started out, Weekendesk experimented until it found the right, profi table business model, not merely 
setting up an online booking site, but also introducing the innovative idea of gift boxes. Eurinpro takes 
this approach even further: after a few turbulent years, all its businesses (offi ce, residential and retail, 
real estate) were phased out, leaving it with just its logistics real estate business. The current business 
model was developed, but not taken for granted, and in the wake of the recent acquisition by Macquarie 
Goodman, Eurinpro is again questioning its current modus operandi and considering the inclusion of 
fresh elements in its business model.
Eurinpro in particular is adopting a proactive market orientation in the running of its business: the 
company focuses on the latent needs of (future) customers, instead of reacting to expressed needs by 
existing customers. For example: Eurinpro exited the highly lucrative offi ce real estate market to focus 
on the logistics real estate market, thereby leaving a lot of money on the table while turning toward a 
new customer segment. Weekendesk on the other hand initially adopted a proactive market orientation 
approach, addressing a new kind of customer, but now it wants to continue further down that path and 
adopt a more reactive approach. From this difference we can conclude that it is one thing being a one-
time strategic innovator, and quite another being a company that continuously keeps looking for new 
ways to adapt its business model. 
SURVEY RESEARCH / 5
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Thirdly, Weekendesk and Eurinpro have been successful strategic innovators because they developed 
unique skills to sustain their business model. This makes it very diffi cult to copy the company’s business 
model: an imitator would also have to replicate the new skills underlying it, turning their whole organization 
upside down. For example, Weekendesk focuses on its key value of “what you see is what you get”, 
employing a whole team of in-house copywriters and photographers. If a traditional travel agency 
wanted to do the same, it would have to completely change its organizational structure. Eurinpro is even 
more extreme in developing unique skills, with the whole fi rm being geared toward delivering tailor-made 
warehouses. To this end the company has its own technical department, it operates an international 
matrix structure, and it has in-house skills to deliver a one-stop-shop to its customers. 
In short, both companies refuse to follow the predominant recipe in their industry and are thereby creating 
new markets. They can only innovate strategically because they share some characteristics: they have a 
visionary CEO, are primarily adopting a proactive approach, and have cultivated unique skills to sustain 
their business model. In addition, we can say that Weekendesk and Eurinpro are different kinds of 
strategic innovators, the main difference being that Eurinpro has an engrained culture of innovation, 
whereas Weekendesk innovated once and is now continuing down its chosen path. Further research is 
needed to establish whether strategic innovation is a one-time event involving the defi nition of the right 
set of skills to sustain an innovative business model or whether it is a continuous process that feeds on 
dynamism. 
5 SURVEY RESEARCH
Apart from our in-depth investigation of two companies in case studies, a large sample of companies was 
contacted and asked to participate in a survey on strategic innovation. The following sections discuss 
the fi ndings of that survey. We begin by presenting the sample of fi rms. Next, we set out the elements of 
strategic innovation and assess the extent to which Flemish fi rms appear to be innovating strategically. 
We then continue the discussion by providing theoretical and empirical proof of the relationship between 
strategic innovation and performance. Finally, the drivers of strategic innovation are discussed. 
5.1.  Sample
The total sample comprised 187 fi rms and almost perfectly represents the range of Flemish fi rms 
with more than 50 employees. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of companies based on their number of 
employees, as determined from three sources: (1) the social security service (RSZ) table, (2) the Arvato 
database from which the addresses were obtained and (3) the sample from the survey. The fi gure shows 
that there are no signifi cant discrepancies between the population and the sample. 
Out of the companies in the sample, 36% are service providers and 64% deliver products. 20% of 
the fi rms are business-to-consumer fi rms, and 80% are business-to-business outfi ts. On average, our 
respondents responsible for running their business were 39 years old and employed 280 people.
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‡ Fig. 1 Distribution of companies according to their number of employees
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5.2.  What are the key elements of strategic innovation?
Based on our review of the literature, our investigation of the material in the case studies, and our 
analysis of the quantitative data, we concluded that strategic innovation comprises four factors.
1. Value innovation
This dimension of strategic innovation entails strategic innovators offering both superior and at the 
same time innovative customer value. Providing superior customer value is essential for achieving a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Although the conceptualization in the literature of what constitutes 
“customer value” is rather fragmented, there is a consensus: namely, that customers’ perceptions of 
what suppliers have to offer are a core element of the concept. Woodruff (1997, p. 142) defi nes customer 
value as “a customer’s perceived preference for and evaluation of those product attributes, attribute 
performances, and consequences arising from use that facilitate (or block) achieving the customer’s 
goals and purposes in use situations”.
Value innovation is defi ned as offering customer value that customers perceive as valuable and new. 
Value innovation is often confused with strategic innovation. Value innovation, while certainly an element 
of strategic innovation, is not all-encompassing (Kim and Mauborgne, 1996). So from our analysis, we 
conclude that value innovation is a necessary component of strategic innovation, but does not cover the 
entire concept. Value innovation refers to the component of strategic innovation that specifi cally defi nes 
the customer value that the strategic innovator delivers to its customers.
2. New market creation
Strategic innovation entails creating a new market. Strategic innovators do not focus on the same 
market segments as their competitors, but instead attract new types of customers. In other words, 
instead of following accepted defi nitions of market boundaries and segmentation, they develop their 
own market. New markets can be created within existing industries by identifying unserved customer 
segments, targeting new combinations of existing customer segments, or redefi ning how the market is 
segmented (Markides, 1997).
This component of strategic innovation helps fi rms to avoid direct competition, because it focuses on 
customers other than incumbent rivals. For this reason, strategic innovators may not be recognized as 
direct competitors by existing fi rms in their sector. Combining value innovation with new market creation 
entails strategic innovators redefi ning existing industry boundaries and creating a unique competitive 
position. 
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3. Go-to-market innovation
Go-to-market innovation entails strategic innovators deviating from established practices in their industry 
in the manner in which they reach and serve their customers. For the most part this means that the 
fi rm is innovative in how it markets its products or services. For example, the emergence of the Internet 
created a wealth of opportunities to reach customers using non-traditional methods. The same will 
probably apply to mobile applications. However, go-to-market innovation need not be limited to using 
new technologies to reach the market; it could involve any kind of novel approach for marketing a fi rm’s 
products and services that differs from the practices of its competitors.
4. Competitive disruption
The fi nal element of strategic innovation has to do with the fact that strategic innovators do not belong 
to existing strategic groups and thereby upset the existing balance between competitors. Several 
academics have noted that over time an industry develops a dominant business model that becomes 
the established industry recipe. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) defi ne the concept of “dominant logic” as 
a mindset or “world view” or the conceptualization of the business and administrative tools required to 
accomplish goals and make decisions in that business. This model can be viewed at the level of individual 
fi rms, but also at the level of an industry. Industry members share similar experiences and environments, 
and thus also share mental models. This mental model can be viewed as a belief structure that contains 
the key elements and relationships that govern an industry and form the basis for any company wishing 
to function within it. (For example, Bettis and Prahalad (1995) mention the presumed importance of 
the liberal arts for any university, an idea that is universally shared across university administrators and 
faculty, though there is no clear compelling evidence for their importance). A strategic group is defi ned 
as a group of fi rms within an industry that pursue similar strategies. A strategic innovator, by defi nition, 
takes a position outside of existing strategic groups. Competitive disruption measures the extent to 
which strategic innovators deviate from the structure existing in their industry and adopt an entirely new 
take on the “rules of the game.”
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 5.3.  To what extent do Flemish fi rms implement the principles of strategic innovation?
Each fi rm was given a score for each of the four elements of strategic innovation discussed in the previous 
section. Table 2 summarizes the mean scores awarded for the sample. They were based on the extent 
to which respondents agreed or disagreed with items that described the company’s strategy. They were 
asked to rate the items on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”. Thus, 
the scores awarded for elements of strategic innovation should be interpreted on a scale of 1 to 7.
Overall, we can conclude that the average fi rm in our sample does not rate highly with respect to 
strategic innovation. The mean scores for all elements apart from value innovation hover around the 
neutral mid-point of the scale. Only value innovation scores somewhat higher, averaging 4.88. 
The last two columns of Table 2 display the statistical confi dence interval of the mean score for each 
factor, this being the interval for which we are 95% certain that the mean lies within the interval’s 
boundaries. The fi rst observation regarding these fi gures is that value innovation scores highest and is 
thus practiced the most by Flemish fi rms. This means that in their quest to innovate strategically, fi rms 
look primarily for ways of creating customer value. The confi dence intervals for the three other elements 
of strategic innovation overlap, suggesting that none dominates the others.
We also compared our sample to an outside sample. We obtained data on a sample of 110 Dutch fi rms 
that were gathered using the same selection and data collection procedures that we followed in our own 
study. Table 3 compares the scores for each of elements of strategic innovation between the Flemish 
and Dutch samples.
‡ Table 2 Mean scores for elements of strategic innovation
FACTOR MEAN STANDARD  95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
  SCORE DEVIATION AROUND THE MEAN SCORE
Value innovation 4.88 1.12 4.72 5.04
New market creation 4.14 1.23 3.96 4.32
Go-to market innovation 4.27 1.31 4.08 4.46
Competitive disruption 3.88 1.17 3.71 4.05
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The results show that Flemish fi rms differ from Dutch fi rms with respect to two elements of strategic 
innovation. Dutch fi rms score higher on average than Flemish fi rms in new market creation, suggesting 
that they are more inclined to innovate by seeking out new market segments. Flemish fi rms, on the other 
hand, are more likely to be innovative regarding their market approach and score slightly higher on go-
to-market innovation than Dutch companies. 
5.4.  Does strategic innovation lead to performance?
5.4.1.  Theoretical foundations for the relationship between strategic innovation and performance
Strategic innovation is all about straying off the beaten track, a practice that runs counter to the usually 
observed pattern, which is that competitors converge in terms of the strategy they employ. Imitating 
rivals and complying with industry standards is a low-risk strategy. But this reinforcement of existing 
competitive relationships impedes differentiation, effectively trapping companies within the existing 
framework for competition. Sharing similar target markets and competing for the same resources 
imposes constraints on performance. Lack of variety between competitors leads to more head-to-head 
competition (Miles et al., 1993). So strategic convergence between similar companies may be harmful 
in the long run.
So does strategic innovation positively impact on a company’s performance? There are several reasons 
why this is thought to be the case.
‡ Table 3 Mean scores for strategic innovation factors for Flemish and Dutch fi rms
FACTOR MEAN SCORE MEAN SCORE STATISTICALLY    
 FLEMISH SAMPLE DUTCH SAMPLE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE?
Value innovation 4.88 4.94 NO 
New market creation 4.14 4.41 YES 
Go-to market innovation 4.27 4.00 YES 
Competitive disruption 3.88 4.03 NO
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2.    The resource-based view identifi es a fi rm’s resources and capabilities as the main source of its competitive advantage. Resources include 
the tangible and intangible assets available to a fi rm, e.g. its know-how, fi nancial resources, and so on. Its capabilities are tangible or intan-
gible procedures that are developed over time using complex interactions and deploying the company’s resources. Throughout this paper, 
we will use the term “resources” to indicate a fi rm’s combined pool of tangible and intangible resources, assets, and capabilities. 
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1. New market space
Strategic innovation leads to the creation of a unique market space. Coupled with this are the advantages 
of uniqueness: a fi rst mover advantage, a (temporary) monopoly, switching costs and subsequent 
customer loyalty. Strategic innovators also develop unique capabilities. The resource-based view holds 
that a fi rm’s resources and capabilities2 and products are two sides of the same coin (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
This implies that a fi rm’s resources underpin the product or service it offers as well as its positioning. 
Companies that pursue different market strategies therefore require a similarly different set of resources. 
From that perspective, resources are prerequisites for the customer value that the fi rm is capable of 
delivering, and can thus be viewed as antecedents to the range of products it offers.
Because strategic innovators compete on different levels, they employ different resources and often also 
attract different customer segments than traditional competitors. Accordingly, we need to stress that 
strategic innovators experience less competition for resources, on both the input and the output sides.
Strategic innovators often constitute groups comprising a solitary fi rm. The existence of single-fi rm 
strategic groups has been reported in the strategic group literature and where their expected performance 
is discussed as follows: (see McNamara et al, 2003) “The resource-based view and contestable markets 
perspectives both suggest that solitary fi rms will be the highest performers. As noted above, the 
resource-based view suggests that fi rms which stake out unique market positions are able to develop 
resource sets that best serve a segment of the market (Peteraf, 1993). Contestable markets theory 
(Baumol et al., 1982) offers a complementary perspective. Firms that identify unique market positions 
isolate themselves from competition and can build a local monopoly. Both lines of reasoning suggest 
that solitary fi rms have the highest fi nancial performance potential.”
Recent research on the performance of solitary fi rms suggests that their performance is lower than 
that of companies that conform more to an existing group (McNamara et al., 2003; Deephouse, 1999). 
This fi nding totally contradicts the notion that “doing things differently” leads to better performance. 
Of course, such a measure misses an additional component that is part of the strategic innovation 
concept, namely added value for customers. The strategic group literature only identifi es fi rms in terms 
of the similarity of their strategies. However, the market perspective is totally ignored. In other words, no 
consideration is given to whether such different strategies yield different customer value. Accordingly, 
when drawing conclusions about performance, the only independent variable that enters the equation 
concerns the similarity in strategy with other competitors.
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2. Lack of imitation
One of the reasons fi rms enjoy superior performance through strategic innovation is because it enables 
them to differentiate themselves from their competitors. Current examples of strategic innovation also 
stand out because the companies that practice it are not widely copied, in spite of their success. This 
lack of imitation reinforces the performance of strategic innovators and enables them to establish fi rst-
mover advantages in building up a unique position in the industry. In addition, they avoid head-to-head 
competition. So, to understand strategic innovation it is vital to comprehend why it is not copied when 
it surfaces in an industry. The nature of incumbent companies goes some way toward explaining this 
lack of imitation, as we will discuss in the next section. However, the nature of strategic innovation itself 
also complicates imitation.
Viewing strategic innovation as a form of innovation concerning the resources and capabilities used to 
compete clarifi es the diffi culty faced by competitors.
Teece et al (1997) said: “The key point is that the properties of an internal organization cannot be 
replicated by a portfolio of business units amalgamated just through formal contracts as many distinctive 
elements of internal organization simply cannot be replicated in the market….Replication takes time, and 
the replication of best practice may be illusive.”
This diffi culty is exacerbated because for incumbent fi rms, imitation not only requires replicating 
the strategic innovator’s critical capabilities, but also annihilating their existing capabilities. Strategic 
innovation breaks with the “dominant logic” and therefore requires “unlearning” from incumbents (Bettis 
and Prahalad, 1995).
Even if the necessary capabilities are visible and possible to imitate or acquire, there are still additional 
hurdles to overcome. We can classify these as (1) causal ambiguity, (2) path dependence, and (3) 
interconnectedness.
Causal ambiguity refers to the diffi culty faced in identifying the factors underlying superior performance. 
This diffi culty is faced within the company experiencing the superior performance, and is even more 
acute for outsiders trying to determine success factors. Causal ambiguity contributes to the diffi culty 
faced by incumbents when identifying exactly what they need to do to adopt a strategic innovation. (For 
example, many traditional airlines fail to successfully add a low-cost, no-frills carrier to their operations. 
Delta has adopted a name (Song) for its low-cost airline that is reminiscent of Air Canada’s (Jazz), 
apparently believing that the name is one key element in attaining success).
The following observation has been made regarding competence-destroying innovation (applied to 
technological capabilities): For innovation in core subsystems, the acquisition of new competences 
from external domains is less organizationally challenging than adapting existing competencies to 
competence-destroying change (Gatignon et al., 2002). This shows that it may be easier to start from 
scratch than to shift gears within an existing organization. Scholars have referred to the “stickiness” of 
resource endowments, implying that companies are to a large extent “stuck” with what they have (Teece 
et al, 1997). This “stickiness” implies that existing competencies direct the future avenues open to a 
company. The fl ip side of this is that companies can become trapped within their current resource base, 
i.e. core competences can become core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). The way companies respond 
to competitive challenges is thus already limited by their current situation. This creates a kind of path 
dependency in the company’s options for change.
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Strategic innovation involves a departure from industry practice, represented not only by adopting a 
single new practice, but by overhauling an entire system. Imitating this innovation entails imitating a 
complex system, with interdependencies between components. Rivkin (2000) conceptualizes a strategy 
as a set of choices, whose outcomes are interdependent. For instance, investments in machines for a 
complex product line are more valuable if the sales force is trained to present the products in question 
to customers. In other words, the value of each individual part of a strategy will depend on the choices 
made regarding other parts. This makes it advisable to aim at optimizing the combined set of choices, 
not individual components. In a similar spirit, Siggelkow (2002) claims that changing only one element 
in an organizational system is ineffective because it creates an organization that is inconsistent (with no 
“fi t” between its individual elements). Other elements need to be modifi ed at the same time. This view of 
strategy as a set of decisions whose usefulness is interdependent suggests that such a strategy cannot 
be imitated just by changing single components. The imitation of strategic innovation entails more than 
making just a few superfi cial changes. In short, the same result cannot be attained without adapting the 
whole system.
3. Lack of competition
It has been recognized that companies envision a limited set of incumbent competitors when formulating 
their competitive strategy, and that it is mainly this set of competitors that infl uences their competitive 
actions (Clark and Montgomery, 1999; Porac and Thomas, 1990). Researchers have commented 
extensively on decision-makers’ tendency  to rely on old frameworks to assess new information (Barr 
and Huff, 1997). This leads established companies to categorize innovative behavior as irrelevant, 
because it does not fi t within existing frameworks of the market or the competitive landscape.
Competitive cognition theory claims that companies do not regard their competitive landscape 
as a homogenous group. The classifi cation of fi rms as focal competitors is based on an underlying 
continuous process in which they are rated along a continuum for a number of relevant attributes, which 
may be similarity-based or size-based (Clark and Montgomery, 1999). This competitor identifi cation 
process directs competitive analysis and fi rms’ subsequent behavior. This means that the interpretation 
of competitive events is affected by a fi rm’s mental model of the competition, which is developed mainly 
by examining the most similar competitors (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Heil and Robertson, 1991; Reger 
and Huff, 1993). This means that competitive actions are expected to have an asymmetrical effect on 
the company’s resulting reactions (Chen 1996). Companies that take up a position that deviates from 
that of their existing competitors therefore escape competitive reaction.
| 28
SURVEY RESEARCH / 5
5.4.2. Empirical support for the relationship between strategic innovation and performance
To be able to investigate empirically whether strategic innovation leads to higher performance, we need 
to defi ne how to measure corporate performance. Two issues are involved here. Firstly, performance is 
a multidimensional construct, for profi t, market share, turnover, and so forth are all valid and potential 
indicators of performance. A second issue regarding the measurement of performance is that it is 
diffi cult to fi nd the right benchmark by which to judge performance in a cross-industry sample. 
To address these issues, we adopted our own measure of performance, using items that primarily 
measure performance relative to either competition or expectations.
The following items were deemed to determine corporate performance:
-  In the past three years, we have been more successful than competitors 
in terms of our profi tability.
-  In the past three years, we have been more successful than competitors 
in terms of our market share.
-  In the past three years, we have been more successful than competitors 
in terms of our turnover.
-  In the past three years, we have been more successful than competitors 
in terms of attracting new customers.
-  In the past three years, the overall performance of our business unit met expectations.
-  In the past three years, the overall performance of our business unit exceeded 
our competitors’ performance.
-  The top management of our business unit was very satisfi ed with our overall 
performance in the past three years.
The correlation between these seven items of performance is high, and they can be combined in a 
single one-dimensional “performance” construct.
The table on the next page summarizes the results from regression analyses conducted with performance 
as the dependent variable. The regression was run with strategic innovation as an overall measure, as well 
as with the four individual elements of strategic innovation. We also investigated the respective effect of 
each element on relative profi tability, market share, turnover, and success in acquiring new customers. 
The regression controls for environmental factors that can explain such aspects of performance as 
demand uncertainty, competitive intensity, technological turbulence, and market growth.
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‡ Table 4 Regression results for the effect of strategic innovation on performance
   (*: statistically signifi cant relationship, .05 signifi cance level)
DEPENDENT OVERALL OVERALL RELATIVE RELATIVE RELATIVE RELATIVE SUCCES
VARIABLE  PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE PROFITABILITY MARKET SHARE TURNOVER IN ACQUIRING
      NEW CUSTOMERS
Independent 
variables
Strategic
innovation 1.114*
Value
innovation  .390* .515* .397* .311* .413*
New market
creation  .049 -.024 .118 .060 .263*
Go-to-market
Innovation  .274* .267* .232* .157 .142
Competitive
disruption  .454* .433* .550* .580* .426*
Demand
uncertainty .026 .047 -.078 .062 .110 .049
Competitive 
intensity -.202* -.159* -.078 -.209* -.189* -.166*
Technological 
 turbulence -.109 -.146* -.107 -.092 -.045 -.190*
 Market
 growth .183* .176* -198* .179* .203* .106
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The results in Table 4 show that strategic innovation has a positive effect on business unit performance. 
When we look at the individual impact of each of the elements of strategic innovation, we see that three 
out of the four are positively and signifi cantly related to performance. New market creation has a positive 
effect, but not signifi cantly so. Unsurprisingly, new market creation has a positive effect on a business 
unit’s success in attracting new customers. However, apparently this does not immediately translate 
into a signifi cant increase in profi t or turnover. Both value innovation and competitive disruption have a 
positive impact on all aspects of performance. Go-to-market innovation apparently leads to profi t and 
market share, but does not signifi cantly affect turnover or the ability to attract new customers.
As for the impact of environmental conditions on business unit performance, we see that demand 
uncertainty has no effect. Competitive intensity and technological turbulence relate negatively to 
performance, whereas market growth relates positively to performance. Remarkably, competitive 
intensity is not signifi cantly linked to profi tability. However, it should be borne in mind that profi tability is 
viewed relative to that of competitors. Competitive intensity can be expected to affect the profi tability of 
all rivals to some extent. We do, however, note that competitive intensity has a negative effect on relative 
market share and turnover. One possible explanation for this fi nding could be that Flemish fi rms prefer to 
sacrifi ce sales and market share and preserve profi tability when faced with competitive pressure.
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5.5.  How do fi rms that innovate strategically differ from others?
Now we have established that strategic innovation enhances performance, the next question is how 
strategic innovation can be stimulated. While Table 2 indicates that on average Flemish fi rms do not 
score extremely high on strategic innovation, it also shows that there are large discrepancies between 
fi rms’ performance. This begs the question as to what differentiates a fi rm that scores low on strategic 
innovation from one that achieves a high score. Broadly, two hypotheses can be formulated to explain 
this. The fi rst hypothesis posits that the environment within which a fi rm operates impacts on the extent 
to which the company in question is strategically innovative. In other words, innovative fi rms operate in 
a different kind of environment than non-innovative fi rms. A second hypothesis seeks an explanation 
rather in the fi rm’s own actions and behavior, suggesting that innovative fi rms display a different type 
of behavior than non-innovative fi rms and are differently organized. The following two sections discuss 
each of these hypotheses in greater depth.
5.5.1.  Environmental predictors of strategic innovation
To see if the environment in which a fi rm operates can explain whether it is more or less strategically 
innovative, we investigated the following environmental factors:
-  the type of industry: manufacturing or the tertiary sector; 
-  the type of market: business-to-consumer or business-to-business market;
-  market growth: average growth over the past three years;
-  demand uncertainty: the extent of change and unpredictability regarding demand and customer 
needs and wants; 
-  competitive intensity: the aggressiveness with which fi rms compete;
-  technological turbulence: the extent of change and technological unpredictability.
Each of these environmental characteristics was related to an overall score for strategic innovation 
(across all four elements).
The results reveal that there is no difference between product-oriented fi rms and service providers in 
terms of their level of strategic innovation. There is also no difference between business-to-consumer 
or business-to-business fi rms. However, market growth does have an impact: the higher the market 
growth, the higher the score on strategic innovation. This shows that fi rms active in growing markets 
are more likely to invest in strategic innovation.
The effect of demand uncertainty on strategic innovation is positive and signifi cant. This indicates that 
fi rms active in a market where customer demands are subject to extensive changes and fl uctuation, are 
more likely to score higher on strategic innovation. This suggests that fi rms are more likely to experiment 
in an environment where customers demand a greater pace of change.
Competitive intensity on the other hand is negatively related to strategic innovation, implying that fi rms 
get too wrapped up in competing head-on, instead of escaping competition by seeking out a new 
competitive position.
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Technological turbulence has no signifi cant effect on strategic innovation. This result underscores the 
fi nding that strategic innovation is unrelated to technological innovation. Strategic innovation can be 
implemented whether a fi rm is in a low-tech or high-tech environment, and fi rms are equally likely to 
invest in it.
Table 5 provides an overview of the results of a regression analysis of the four signifi cant environmental 
predictors of strategic innovation.
5.5.2.  Organizational predictors of strategic innovation
5.5.2.1.  Sense-and-respond capabilities
In this section, we explore which of the fi rm’s procedures and actions prompt strategic innovation. We 
focus on a broad set of capabilities labeled “sense-and-respond capabilities”, a wide set of activities 
and processes that comprise an organization’s ability to respond to its environment. They include 
gathering information, disseminating information, and responding to such information as a company. 
The information in question can relate to three domains: the market, competitors, and technology. 
A wide range of organizational capabilities and/or organizational characteristics could potentially explain 
strategic innovation. Organizational capabilities include new product development, speed of decision-
making, supply chain management, and other factors. Examples of organizational characteristics are 
the size of the company, the composition of its staff, its system of remuneration, its organizational 
structure, its leadership, the composition of its top management team, and so forth. It is impossible to 
include all these factors in a possible explanation of strategic innovation. 
We chose to focus on sense-and-respond capabilities for three main reasons. Firstly, such capabilities 
can be applied and prove effective across industries. Secondly, sense-and-respond capabilities can be 
developed by any fi rm and are thus subject to its own control and efforts. Accordingly, any conclusions 
about the effectiveness of sense-and-respond capabilities immediately have practical managerial 
implications. Thirdly, the focus on sense-and-respond capabilities stems from the dynamic nature of 
any industrial environment. Over time, changes in the business environment (of a regulatory, economic, 
political, or other nature), customer needs, market composition, demographic changes, 
‡ Table 5 Regression coeffi cients of environmental predictors on strategic innovation 
  (*: statistically signifi cant relationship, .05 signifi cance level)
 
 STRATEGIC INNOVATION
Independent variables
 
Demand uncertainty .375*
Competitive intensity -.182*
Technological turbulence .106
Market growth .154*
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and technological advances all create fresh opportunities to carve out new strategic positions. We 
hypothesize that a fi rm’s sense-and-respond capabilities will help it recognize these changes and the 
opportunities arising from them and will thus stimulate strategic innovation.
We investigate the following sense-and-respond capabilities of fi rms:
-  reactive market orientation;
-  proactive market orientation;
-  emerging market orientation;
-  reactive competitor orientation;
-  proactive competitor orientation;
-  reactive technological orientation;
-  proactive technological orientation.
Market orientation entails listening to customers and responding to their interests and wants. A distinction 
can be drawn here between reactive and proactive market orientation. A reactive market orientation 
focuses on the manifest and expressed needs of customers, whereas a proactive market orientation 
focuses on latent and nascent needs of customers (Narver et al., 2004). A third type of market orientation 
is emerging market orientation, which entails gathering and disseminating information on potential 
customers and thereby helping the fi rm to identify emerging, albeit small, customer segments.
Competitor orientation involves activities concerning the gathering of information on competitors, 
the assessment of competitors, and the response made to these competitors. Again, we distinguish 
between reactive competitor orientation and proactive competitor orientation. Reactive competitor 
orientation is geared at past actions and the current strategy, goals and offerings of competitors. 
Proactive competitor orientation means focusing on the future actions and strategy of competitors and 
on recognizing potential new competitors. 
Srinivasan et al. (2002) discuss the concept of technological sense-and-respond capabilities. Proactive 
technological orientation refers to an organization’s efforts to regularly scan information on new 
technological opportunities, whether internally or externally. It results in an ability to acquire knowledge 
about and understand new technological developments. A reactive technological orientation refers to 
an organization’s willingness to respond to new technology in its environment.
Table 6 depicts the areas of reactive and proactive sense-and-respond capabilities that we 
investigated.
‡ Table 6 Overview of proactive and reactive sense and respond capabilities
 
 REACTIVE PROACTIVE
Market orientation manifest needs of customer latent needs of customers
Competitor orientation direct competition indirect/future competition 
Technological orientation existing technology new technology
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5.5.2.2.  Empirical evidence of the effect of sense-and-respond capabilities on strategic innovation 
Table 7 provides an overview of the results of a regression analysis of sense-and respond capabilities 
on strategic innovation, while checking for environmental predictors.
The results indicate that both reactive and proactive market orientation lead to strategic innovation. 
The signifi cance of these organizational predictors is important because these are factors, other than 
environmental predictors, that are under the fi rm’s control and can be explicitly manipulated to stimulate 
strategic innovation.
The following types of behavior and attitude refl ect reactive market orientation:
-  we constantly monitor our level of commitment and orientation to serve our customers’ needs;
-  we freely communicate information about our successful and unsuccessful customer experiences 
across the entire business;
-  we measure customer satisfaction systematically and frequently;
-  data on customer satisfaction are regularly disseminated to all levels of this business unit;
-  our strategy for gaining a competitive advantage is based on our understanding of our customers’ 
needs;
-  we are more customer focused than our competitors;
-  I believe this business exists primarily to serve its customers.
‡ Table 7 Regression coeffi cients of organizational and environmental predictors on strategic innovation  
  (*: statistically signifi cant relationship, .05 signifi cance level)
 
 STRATEGIC INNOVATION
Independent variables 
 Reactive market orientation .144*
 Proactive market orientation .251*
 Emerging market orientation .057
 Reactive competitor orientation .082
 Proactive competitor orientation .008
 Reactive technological orientation .106
 Proactive technological orientation -.086
 Demand uncertainty .215*
 Competitive intensity -.151*
 Technological turbulence .062
 Market growth .074
| 35
SURVEY RESEARCH / 5
Reactive market orientation can thus be regarded as a culture in which customers occupy a central 
role. This is refl ected in concrete actions to measure customer satisfaction, but it does not stop there. 
To be truly market oriented, an organization needs to actively work with this information. This means 
that customer information is disseminated throughout the organization and inspires and guides future 
actions.
The following types of behavior and attitudes refl ect proactive market orientation:
-  we help our customers anticipate developments;
-  we continuously try to discover additional needs of which our customers are unaware;
-  we incorporate solutions to unarticulated customer needs into our new products and services;
-  we brainstorm on how customers use our products and services;
-  we search for opportunities in areas where customers have a diffi cult time voicing their needs;
-  we work closely with leading users to try and recognize customer needs months or even years 
before the majority of the market may zero in on  them;
-  we extrapolate key trends to gain an insight into what users in a current market will need in the future.
The key difference between reactive and proactive market orientation is the latter’s forward-looking 
nature. It is not about responding to customer’s current needs, but about anticipating their future 
requirements. 
As is clear from Table 7 above, both reactive and proactive market orientation have a positive impact on 
strategic innovation. However, proactive market orientation has the largest impact. The conclusion from 
this is that proactive market orientation leads fi rms to develop more innovative approaches to reach the 
market. 
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6 IMPLICATIONS
 In this section we set out a number of implications of this study.
1. Competing in highly competitive environments
How can a fi rm deal with intense competitive pressure? The tendency is to get wrapped up in destructive 
competitive battles in an attempt to preserve market share or market dominance. Our results show that high 
competitive intensity has a negative effect on the fi rm’s performance: specifi cally, turnover and market share 
suffer. In spite of strategic innovation’s positive effect on performance, we actually observe that fi rms operating 
in a highly competitive environment are actually less likely to be strategically innovative. However, it is precisely 
in such an environment that strategic innovation matters the most. Strategic innovation provides a way for 
fi rms to turn around the negative effect of a highly competitive environment, enabling them to deliberately 
escape the battle for supremacy by choosing to occupy a position in which it is no longer directly competing. 
On page 22 we discuss how strategic innovators defi ne a new value proposition and create a new market, 
effectively setting their fi rm apart from competitors and allowing them to escape head-on competition.
It is a natural reaction for fi rms that are faced with strong competition to have to focus all their energy and 
resources on dealing with these competitive battles. Unfortunately, that leaves little time and scant energy and 
resources to take a step back and consider alternative paths. It is precisely those fi rms who need strategic 
innovation most of all that least consider the possibilities it offers! Thus, a substantial effort is needed to 
educate fi rms about the nature and potential of strategic innovation. 
2. Market orientation
Our fi ndings underscore the critical role that market orientation plays in fostering strategic innovation. 
But what exactly does this mean? As we can see from the discussion on page 35, market orientation 
translates both into a company culture and into concrete actions. An organization’s culture is a deeply 
rooted set of values and norms that drive behavior within that entity. Having a market-oriented culture 
implies customers occupying a central role in each decision and action that the fi rm takes. At the heart of 
this approach is a mindset that the fi rm only exists thanks to its customers and that it is therefore critical 
to listen and respond to customers’ needs. It requires a consistent effort on the part of management to 
monitor whether this mindset is present, fostered, and stimulated.
Market orientation also translates into concrete actions that the company takes to monitor market 
developments and gather information and actively integrate this information in the decision-making 
process. A key issue therefore is that the company needs access to market information and/or suitable 
resources to acquire market information. 
3. Focus on technology 
Our results show that strategic innovation is entirely distinct from technological innovation. We also 
observe that technological turbulence in the market where the fi rm operates has no impact on strategic 
innovation, which again reinforces the claim that technology does not play a central role in strategic 
innovation. Technology can at most be an enabler of innovative business models, but it is neither a 
necessary component, nor the central focus of such a model. 
Actions to foster innovation in organizations should therefore not focus solely on technological innovation, 
but rather adopt a broader outlook regarding the nature of innovation. 
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